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DETERMINISM

FROM

HOBBES TO HUME.

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE

UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOHN PHELPS FRUIT.

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In the preparation of this sketch of Determinism I have consulted the following authors, cited by abbreviations in brackets.

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CHAPTER I.

REVOLT AGAINST SCHOLASTICISM.

Modern philosophy took its rise in conditions which revealed the futility of scholastic methods and led to a repudiation of the transcendental notions of the Middle Ages. Thinking man had lost himself in speculations about the attributes of God, about number, about the orders of the angels, about immortality, in short, about every conceivable question that lay outside the range of common sense. The things found within the circle of man's every-day life were regarded as 'of the earth, earthy', and therefore repugnant to the sublimated spirit of Scholasticism. There resulted, consequently, a body of the most formal knowledge, handicapped by the profoundest mysticism. Both the logic and this philosophical mysticism, in fact all learning, was under the domination of theology. The spirit of that theology demanded absolute credulity, and everywhere through all forms of thought this spirit was diffused [1]). Through the long night of the Middle Ages, the human mind slept, unconscious of its prerogative of independent thought and its right of private judgment. To believe, and not to question, was the dictum of the power that was supreme. Against this demand for absolute credulity, Descartes was bold enough to make Doubt the foundation stone of the new philosophy. To us, in this wide awake century, it appears something remarkable and strange that the human mind could ever have had much interest in the dry abstractions and barren generalities of the Scholastic philosophy, but the literature of that time shows an interest in the Syllogism as an instrument of knowledge, only surpassed by the interest of the present age in Scientific investigations. You may have a picture of the interest manifested in Aristotle, if you can imagine, at Oxford alone, in the twelfth century, 30 000 scholars; and at Paris, that there was no building large enough to accommodate the numbers that flocked to hear Abelard, and that when he retired to solitude, such multitudes followed him that the desert became a town. Then imagine that when the encyclopedia of Aristotle appeared, overlaid and embarrassed by Arabic obscurities and Greek subtilties accruing through centuries, these eager students mastered it, and with the syllogism as an instrument rushed headlong into every (transcendental) question in every direction.¹)

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[1]) Lecky 1: 408.

Consult Peter Lombard's "Liber Sententiarum", a textbook of that age, for the statement of some of the questions discussed. For examples, they debated whether God could cause that, the place and body being retained, the body shall have no position; or whether the impossibility of being engendered is a constituent property of the first Person of the Trinity; or whether a glorified body can occupy one and the same place at the same time with another glorified body; or whether in a state of innocence all children were masculine.

It is not to be wondered at that we should, at length, find the human mind coming to itself, that is, waking up and, so to speak, 'rubbing the sleep out of its eyes'. There must needs come some recoil from the vanity and nothingness of such speculations. Of this transition period Giordano Bruno is the most conspicuous example. In him we find revolt against authority, exultation in the liberty of thought, and a tearing down of the artificial distinctions between the secular and the divine. From new and independent standpoints he looked at the problems that had engaged so much fruitless effort, but the time was not ripe for him to become the deliverer out of this bondage.

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¹) Taine: Eng. Lt. Bk. I: ch. III.

So long as philosophy was subservient to theology there could be no broadminded philosophers, striking out into paths whithersoever the truth might lead. All thought was under the censorship of theology, and there was nothing more, and could be nothing more, than the hairsplittings and wrangling of theologians.

The deliverance came at last from without 'the pale of the church', in the persons of the secular philosophers, as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and their contemporaries and successors. It was the secularisation of philosophy and the rationalisation of religion that set the human mind in the highway to better things. What they accomplished in destroying the old modes of thought was not by dint of polemical discussion, but by offering methods of enquiry more fruitful in results, and by erecting standards of excellence incompatible with the old. They impressed upon men that credulity was a sign of weakness, and that to prejudices of all sorts no quarter should be given, and, moreover, that what came to them from the past should be accepted only after the most scrutinizing and cautious analysis, and, to all this, they inspired a courage that would not shrink from the sacrifice of the most cherished doctrine and the dearest tie, in order to find the truth. 1)

Lord Bacon with his Titanic intellect made excursions into all the realms of knowledge, and was pre-eminently qualified to be the forerunner and herald of the emancipation. We might say that his classification of the *idola,* or distorting influences that act on the mind, with his constant injunction to test and correct theory by confronting it with facts, is his proclamation on the inauguration of the new order of things.

He claims to have discovered the unfruitfulness of the Aristotelian method, while a youth, at Cambridge. His quarrel was with the *method;* but method, with a mind so utilitarian and practically wise, meant everything in the way of ends and purposes to be attained through method. In his opinion the

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1) Lecky: 1: 402.

race had not been 'clothed upon' in any sense, by the warp and woof, spun and woven, by the dogmatic metaphysicians of the past out of their own innermost conceits. He believed that the greatness and progress of mankind depended upon discovery, and the first discovery he would have man make was the discovery, or rather the re-discovery of himself, that is, to realize his ability to think for himself, that he had been long enough the dupe of tradition.

Bacon had the faith of a discoverer, the imagination of a poet, and the voice of a prophet.¹) *Scientia est potentia; natura parendo vincitur.* His purpose was to furnish a method that would place the human mind on the same plane with the things in the world of mankind and nature. He maintained that experience was worthless without reasoning, and reasoning likewise useless without experience. The divorcement of the two was the explanation of the unfruitfulness of Aristotelianism. The two must be united in congenial, lawful compact. But before such a union could be effected it was necessary that the mind be freed from four kinds of *idola.* Doubt is the first step. The rubbish of preconceived opinions and authorities thus removed, the individual is ready to observe and experiment and generalize and make good his claim to lordship over creation.

The title of the first part of the *Novum Organum,* which consists of 130 aphorisms, is sufficiently explicit of Bacon's purposes as apposed to the Schoolmen. It runs: '*Aphorismi de interpretatione naturae, et regno hominis.*' It is worth the while to quote one or two of these aphorisms, apropos to our theme, in order to show Bacon's insight and cogency. This first: All these idola are solemnly and forever to be renounced, and the understanding must be thoroughly cleared and purged of them; for the kingdom of man, which is founded in the sciences, cannot be entered otherwise than the kingdom of God, that is, in the condition of a little child. — Aph. 68.²)

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1) Ch. 179.

2) B. 11: 440.

This is plain enough for 'the wayfaring man', and therefore needs no comment. Aphorism 126 reads: The truth is, we intend and propose the art of doubting properly for we do not detract from, but administer to the sense; and do not despise, but regulate, the understanding. And it is better to know so much as is necessary, and yet not think ourselves to know all, than to think that we know all, and yet remain ignorant of that which is necessary.¹)

Bacon deserves all honor for the results accruing from the Inductive method, in that he launched it in a way, and at 'a tide in the affairs of men', that made it the one great benefaction to which the modern world must ascribe the great benefits of discovery and invention, and progress in general. But he was himself no discoverer, and was wise enough to know it, and expressed it in language full of egotism, but pardonable in that the ages since have justified his estimate of himself. 'Ego enim buccinator tantum, pugnam non ineo: unus fortasse ex iis, de quibus Homerus:

*Χαίρετε, Κήρυκες, Διὸς ἄγγελον ἠδὲ καὶ ανδρῶν.*²)

If he did not enter 'the promised land' himself, it was glory enough to have had the Pisgah-view, and pointed it out to his followers. He is thereby the founder of modern philosophy in both its rationalistic and emperical directions. Descartes developed from one side what Bacon suggested, and Hobbes found in him ample grounds for his empiricism.

The fight was on; the new against the old; Bacon did no more than plan the attack and call the hosts to arms. It was a war of giant intellects. Hobbes was the first who aimed effectual blows at that philosophy upon which the church had authoritatively settled itself as its deep foundation stone.

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¹) B. 11: 455.

²) B. 11: 342.

CHAPTER II.

THOMAS HOBBES (1588—1679).

I. *The New or Mechanical Philosophy.*

Whence came to the keen and clear intellect of Hobbes the impulse to philosophical inquiry? Certainly not so far back as his student days at Oxford, for he had there nothing more than the tedious routine of the Scholastic System. In fact, he served, so to speak, a five years' apprenticeship, in Magdalen College, to Scholasticism. He himself recalls, in his eighty-fourth year,[1]) that he was put to lessons, at Oxford, in the lowest class in logic under a callow tutor, with whom he threaded the mazes of the moods and figures of the syllogism. While he found other things more entertaining than logic, he yet learned it and esteemed himself a good disputant.

When he was passed to physics he received strictly orthodox instruction, for he was taught that all things are composed of matter and form as parts, and that species of things floating through the air convey forms to the eye and sounds to the ear, and that effects in nature are due to sympathy and antipathy, and more of like nature. He relates that he turned from such unintelligible stuff to things more interesting found in the Stationers' shops, namely, the maps and charts, celestial and terrestrial, upon which he traced the paths of the sun and moon and stars, or followed Drake and Cavendish over the main to unknown lands.

When we remember that, at Oxford, at this time, the ecclesiastical conflict was rife, and that there was a consequent dearth both in discipline and studies, we have an explanation of why Hobbes took, according to Aubrey, more interest in snaring jackdaws, and gazing on charts and maps at the bookbinder's. He got his modicum of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, and left Oxford, in a state of indifference as to the philosophy he aided so efficiently afterwards in overturning.

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[1]) "Vita carmine expressa". L. I: LXXXIX.

On his first journey abroad, 1619, with young Cavendish, he found first of all the philosophy he had learned at Oxford in disrepute with the men of the world. He found himself unprepared to properly appreciate what Kepler and Galileo were setting forth as to the physical world. Their discoveries were, to him, wonders, explainable, but not understood. He was impressed that the traditional philosophy was worn out, and that it had been 'laid upon the shelf', by the progressive minds of the new age. This was sufficient to cause him to cast it away, and while not yet able to grasp the promises of physical science which was ever afterwards to compete with philosophy for the attention of inquiring minds, he yet, returned home from this first journey resolved to make himself a scholar. It is not necessary to speak of the regimen to which he submitted himself in accomplishing his purpose; nor can we delay to speak of his relations to a long list of friends. It is sufficient to mention those few names that had decided weight in shaping the bold spirit of Hobbes to become the forceful expounder of a new philosophy.

The first in the list is Bacon. If we are to believe Aubrey with reference to the personal intimacy that existed between these two philosophers we must conclude that Bacon had, at least, a powerful, though, perhaps general, influence on Hobbes. That the period of this intimate friendship coincided with the closing years of Bacon's life, when, stripped of his official dignities, he gave himself up to his philosophical labors, must add weight to the opinion that Bacon was a great quickener of the philosophic spirit in Hobbes. But that his influence was nothing more than general is quite probable from the fact that Hobbes makes only two references 1) to Bacon's works, and never mentions him along with Galileo, Kepler, Harvey and other names as the founders of the new philosophy.

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1) L., IV. 316: E. VII. 112.

A more decided determination of Hobbes's philosophizing may have come from his friendship with Edward Herbert, afterwards Lord Cherbury. Herbert's "De Veritate" came out in 1624. Hobbes's increasing interest in philosophical inquiries was no doubt spurred by this treatise in the opposite direction. The two philosophers, however, had a common interest in the rationalistic criticism of religion, but each from a different standpoint. If Herbert be named the founder of English Deism, then Hobbes comes next in succession.

On his third journey abroad (1634—37) Hobbes received his decisive philosophical impulse. He expresses himself as almost infatuated with the idea of motion in nature. Whatever he does, wherever he goes; whether he walks, or rides, or sails, *motion* is forever claiming his attention and pressing itself upon him as the clue to the infinite variety of the universe.[1]) Motion as the key to the phenomenal world is deeply engraven upon his mind and heart.

The exact date of this revelation, or discovery, is not known, but it is known that in 1636, before total blindness came upon Galileo, he enjoyed what may be called an intimate relationship with this patriarchal discoverer of the laws of motion.[2]) In his epistle dedicatory of his "Elements of Philosophy", Hobbes mentions Galileo with the profoundest respect, naming him 'the first that opened to us the gate of natural philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the nature of motion'.[3]) The expression, 'natural philosophy universal', indicates the whole trend of Hobbes's efforts which was to frame a system of knowledge universal in its application to the visible world of men and things. So between Bacon and Hobbes, and likewise between Bacon and Descartes, the two heads, respectively, of Empiricism and Rationalism, is Galileo of conspicuous importance to Hobbes, and pehaps, of no less significance to Descartes. In Galileo are to be found not only the spirit but the chief characteristics of the new philosophy in both its principal directions[1].)

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[1]) Vit. carm. exp. L. 1: LXXXIX.

[2]) R. 36.

[3]) E. 1: VIII.

Hobbes himself relates how he was directed to explain *Sensation* in terms of motion. [2]) He argued that if bodies and their internal parts were in a state of perfect rest, or if moved, moved ever in the same way, there would be no ground for distinguishing one thing from another, and consequently there could be no sense; wherefore the cause of all things must be sought in the diversity of movements. Taking this as a first principle he realized that he must go to geometry for insight into the nature and modes of motion.

This was the status of Hobbes's philosophical inquiries when he returned to England in 1637; he had a plan merely, nothing wrought out. In contrast with him it should be mentioned that in this same year, 1637, Descartes "Discourse on Method" appeared. While Descartes was, in a sense, a ripe philosopher, Hobbes only had at command the thoughts for original work.

Père Mersenne, the head of the scientific circle at Paris, the intimate friend of Descartes, gave Hobbes a cordial welcome, in his flight [3]) from England in 1640. Mersenne was the more pleased to receive Hobbes, as he had been commissioned by Descartes to gather objections to his "Méditationes de Prima Philosophia", before he should give it to the public. Hobbes set down sixteen objections, [4]) which Mersenne transmitted to Descartes as the objections of a distinguished thinker of a new order. [5]) In this way he was ackowledged as a philosopher of rank, although he had published nothing: not till 1642 did his "De Cive" appear, but in 1640 he had written out the outlines of his doctrine of Human Nature and circulated it privately.[6])

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[1]) F. 47: 66.

[2]) Vit. Carm. Exp. L., 1: XX.

[3]) E. IV: 414.

[4]) L. V: 249—74.

[5]) R. 54.

[6]) L. V: 309—318.

Both Descartes and Hobbes conceived that physical facts and processes were to be interpreted as purely mechanical, but they thought such a doctrine must be but a wider system of general knowledge: this was the old conception of philosophy. So Descartes would frame a universal system of knowing, starting from the subjective point of view, making it his first care to understand the relation of nature and mind; Hobbes made no question concerning this relation, but developed from the objective side his scheme, so comprehensive in practical directions.

When Hobbes conceived that sensation and the mental states arising therefrom were explicable as peculiar motions in the human body determined by motions in other bodies, he was beyond the range of what the mechanical philosophy had yet attempted. And while Descartes was led to regard sensation as explicable in terms of motion, Hobbes went still further in maintaining that all possible consequences of sensation, involving all occurrences and relations depending upon the mental nature of man, were to be explained on phenomenal principles. For him the world consisted of animate and inanimate *natural* bodies and *political* bodies, and to explain these phenomena from universal principles was his conception of the scope of philosophy.

Before formulating the principles of magnitude and motion by which the tangible world was to be explained, he deems it proper to say something concerning the principles of knowing. Quite in contrast to Descartes, he merely touches upon, without discussing, the fundamental question of the relation of being to knowing.

He defines philosophy as 'such a knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have of their causes or generation: and again of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects'.¹)

In thus limiting philosophy to the consideration of things

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¹) E. 1: 3.

that appear, he shuts out entirely all those supersensual questions to which the Schoolmen devoted themselves wholly. *Body* and the affections of body, is the proper study of the philosopher. He uses the word "body" instead of "nature" because it agrees better with his mathematical and physical doctrines. There are two kinds of bodies, namely, bodies natural, and bodies civil. And because *man* is at the same time the maker and the matter of the body civil, he is of the utmost significance. "Body, Man, Citizen", expresses the whole range of Hobbes's philosophy, and also indicates his plan of development. "De Corpore", "De Homine", "De Cive" were the three systematic treatises to be worked out in this succession.

The Revolution came: "De Corpore" was laid aside, and force of circumstances plucked "De Cive" out of its order, it being the first of the series published, in 1642. But before either "De Corpore" or "De Homine", came "Leviathan" in 1651, setting forth in the first part, 'Man', his doctrine of human nature, and repeating his psychological theory of the development of knowledge;[1]) in the second part showing the generation of 'Commonwealth'; in the third 'A Christian Commonwealth'; and last, 'The Kingdom of Darkness'. The unsettled state of public opinion no doubt elicited "Leviathan".

At the age of sixty-four Hobbes found himself again in England, when he applied himself to set forth the foundations of his philosophy, and his doctrine of human nature, in more technical form, in "De Corpore" (1655), and "De Homine" (1658).

He supposes the annihilation of all things except one man, and then asks what would be left for him to reason upon? Evidently nothing but the 'phantasms' of things that had a being outside the mind. He defines *Space* as the phantasm of a thing existing without the mind simply. Then, as a body to be body must have magnitude, there would be left a phantasm of its magnitude, and a phantasm of a moved body passing from one space into another by succession gives the idea of *Time*. Time is a phantasm of motion.[1]

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[1]) 'Human Nature' 1650. E. IV = 1—76.

In short, body has only one constant quality, namely, extension, subjectively represented as space, while all its manifold changes and aspects are to be explained in terms of motion, which is represented subjectively as Time. Starting with these fundamental subjective notions of space and time one might expect an explanation of being from the side of thought, but he never makes any question of the absolute existence of Body as Descartes: he accepts it as unqualifiedly as any positive scientist, and proceeds at once to look for the simplest terms in which to express its various manifestations.

A body, he says, is that which having no dependence upon our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space.[2] Then follows logically his explanation of Accident, under which term he understands quality or attribute. But as accident is neither body, nor part of body, nor anything inherent in body, he takes the pains to explain it by examples, and does it somewhat in this manner: Imagine a body as coextended with (filling) space, this coextension is not the coextended body; or that the body is removed from its place, the removing is not the removed body; or that the body is at rest; the rest is not the resting body. These are the accidents of that body.[3] "An accident is that faculty of any body, by which it works in us a conception of itself."[4] An accident is merely the manner of our conception of a body. He further explains that an accident is not in the body in the sense that blood is in a bloody cloth, for then accident would be a part of body, but that it is in it in such a manner that it may be away, the subject still remaining.[5]

The world of phenomena is but the ceaseless generation and destruction of accidents. There is, however, one accident which never perishes so long as the body exists, namely, Extension. How are we to account for the multifarious aspects (accidents) of body that make the visible universe? By motion. And motion in a given body can only come from another contiguous and moved body,[1] thus constituting the world a pure machine.

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[1] E. 1: 91 seq.

[2] E. 1: 102.

[3] Ibid.

[4] E. 1: 103.

[5] E. 1: 104.

It follows from the definition of accident, that an accident perishes, and another is generated, outright, that is, there is no such thing as an accident's going out of one subject into another. For example, in writing, the hand being moved, moves the pen; motion does not go out of the hand into the pen, else the writing might continue though the hand stood still; but a new motion is generated in the pen, and belongs to the pen.[2]

It would be difficult to imagine a more thoroughly mechanical relation of things. Consistently with this view, he, in discussing cause and effect as the next step in the development of this system, reduces all causes, *material, formal,* and *final,* to efficient causes.[3] In the question of cause and effect bodies stand to one another as *agent* and *patient,* but we must keep in mind that it is not by the mere quality (accident) of extension that one body becomes agent to another as patient, for, if so, the same agent would produce the same effects in all patients. What takes place between bodies depends upon their special accidents. Whatever effect is wrought in any patient is but the generation or destruction of some accident, and the cause is found in the accidents of agent and patient together. 'All mutation whether of agent or patient, is motion, and all effects with respect to their causes come to pass with equal necessity.'[4] Every effect is produced by a necessary cause in the sense that when the cause entire is present the effect cannot be conceived as not following. He maintains that first causes have no place except in such things as have sense and will, and these, he proposes to prove, are really nothing more than efficient causes. His fulfilment of this promise is his doctrine of determinism.

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[1] E. 1: 124.

[2] E. 1: 117.

[3] E. 1: 127.

[4] E. 1: 126.

II. *Determinism.*

It follows logically from Hobbes's conception of Body as the only real thing, and of Space as only a phantasm, that the world is a *plenum.* With this doctrine and his theory that all mutation is explicable in terms of motion, the world is a huge machine of which man is the integral part. Therefore whatever takes place in man as a patient, or through him as an agent, is, when reduced to its lowest terms, Motion.

In "De Corpore" man is considered as a natural body, along with other natural bodies, and in Part IV., called "Physics, or the Phenomena of Nature", the topics of 'Sense' and 'Animal Motion' are discussed.

As a kind of introduction to his discussion of sense, he observes that the most noteworthy of all the phenomena is that of *apparition,* that is, the fact that some natural bodies have in themselves the patterns of almost all things, while others of these bodies have none at all. That means that these latter have not sense. These appearances which we find in ourselves are the principles by which we know other things, but aback of that is the question of knowing these principles themselves. He says we know them through sense, for all the knowledge we have is derived from it. If we inquire after the causes of sense the search must begin with the phenomenon of sense itself, and then a still deeper question suggests itself to him: By what sense shall we take notice of sense?[1]) He thinks that sense in the form of memory is sufficient to account for this inner consciousness of cognition, but there is here evident to him a field for special inquiry, into which had he entered his solution would, no doubt, have been only a further extension of his explanation of the immediate cause of sense, which is, the reaction of the physical organism against an external stimulus. 'Sense, in the sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient; and the parts so moved are parts of the organ of sense.' 1) When the organ of sense is touched the motion is propagated through the successive parts to the innermost, there a reaction takes place extending not only through successive parts to the uttermost, but to the object contiguous to the organ, and to the next contiguous body and so on till we come to that from which we derive the phantasm. This source of phantasms or ideas is called the *Object.* In his own words: Sense is a phantasm, made by the reaction and endeavor outwards in the organ of sense, caused by an endeavor inwards from the object. 2) His conception of endeavor is an important point in his system. He defines it as a motion made in less space than can be imagined. 3)

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[1]) E. 1: 389.

Couple this idea of reaction and endeavor with that of the organs of sense and we see how he blazed out the way for physiological psychology. Organs are such parts of the sentients, as, if injured, the generation of phantasms is destroyed. These parts are certain spirits and membranes proceeding from the *pia mater* and extending till they involve the brain and all the nerves, which being stimulated, the heart, which he considers the fountain of all sense, is stirred to action with them. 4) The heart is regarded as the source whence the vital principle, or 'spirits' are distributed for the propagation of stimuli to the brain which is the workshop where the elaboration of sensations into the different forms of knowledge takes place.

In discussing animal motion, he accepts quite eagerly Harvey's discovery, for it is through the circulation of the blood that the 'spirits' are directed in such a manner as is most conducive to the preservation and augmentation of (animal) motion.

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1) E. 1: 390.
2) E. 1: 391.
3) E. 1: 206.
4) E. 1: 392.

Appetite is defined as the first endeavor towards things known from experience to be pleasant, and *aversion* is the shunning what is unpleasant. Between appetite and aversion living creatures are tossed as a weaver's shuttle. The period of such an unrest with regard to any particular course is called *deliberation.* When deliberation ends in a decision, that last act is called the *Will.* 'Will is the last appetite in deliberating'.[1]) This is will with reference to the genus, sentient creatures, and lest we should forget that man is included, Hobbes is careful to remind us that is not different in man. Not until he is pressed by Bishop Bramhall does he regard will as anything more than the mental aspect of a mechanical process, and then he considers man no less mechanically moved for being conscious of the same motion. The Bishop had misinterpreted Hobbes as declaring that the will is only moved by outward objects. Hobbes replied that he had always avoided attributing motion to anything except body, adding; 'The will is produced, generated, formed and created in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject; but moved it cannot be, because it goeth not from place to place'.[2]) In the next place, in the matter of willing, or not willing, man is put on the same footing with other sentient creatures. Where there is appetite, the entire cause of appetite has preceded, and so the act of appetite follows of necessity. There is no such liberty as is free from necessity in the will, either of men or beasts. Liberty can be predicated only of the ability to do what has been willed.[3]) This is in brief his doctrine of determinism relative to living creatures as a class, and is meant to be preliminary to setting man up as the central figure of his system. In "Leviathan" where Man is first contemplated in himself, the line of argument, already indicated, is repeated, leading up to the question of the will. What is new relative to the determination of the will is more in the form of expression than in substance. He suggests that the word *deliberation* means putting an end to the *liberty* we had of doing, or omitting, according to our appetite, or aversion. In the vicissitudes of appetites and aversions we have no liberty, because we are tossed as a ball from one to the other; the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or the omission thereof, is the will; and note that it is the act, not the faculty of willing. 1)

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[1]) E. I: 409; III: 49; II: 21, 23; IV: 68, 70, 273, 275.

[2]) E. V: 313.

[3]) E. I: 409.

If the will is the last appetite in deliberating, what answer must be given the man who claims that he once had a will to do a thing, but forbore doing it? This is properly speaking an inclination, which does not make an action voluntary. It is the last inclination that decides, for if the intervenient appetites make any action voluntary; then by the same reason all intervenient aversions would make the same action involuntary, and so we should have the same action both voluntary and involuntary. 2)

Man is an automaton 3); the notion of personality, especially in its characteristic of self-determination, is excluded. Nothing takes its beginning from itself, but from the action of some agent immediately without, so that, if a man has an appetite or will to something, to which just previous he had had no inclination, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not at his disposing. 4) The argument is, that what are called voluntary actions are necessarily caused, for they are caused by the will, which in its turn, is necessitated.

The absurdity of the question is further shown in this way: A man can no more say he will will, than he will will will . . . . . to infinity. 5)

Despite this clearing up of the matter so far as it regards the will, there is yet a liberty somewhere which has been

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1) E. III: 48.

2) E. III: 49.

3) E. III: Introd.

4) E. IV: 274.

5) E. IV: 69.

mistaken for the liberty of the will. What is it? The liberty of the agent. To maintain that the will, which is a power belonging to the agent, is free, is to identify the will with the agent. That this is the solution is indicated in his definition of liberty: Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent.¹) The *faculty* of willing is an intrinsical quality of the agent, but an *act* of the will is an accident generated by something from without.

The consistency of liberty and necessity in the same subject is illustrated by water, which being at liberty to descend a channel, does so of necessity.²) The liberty in question is a natural liberty. It is natural for the agent to act in the direction of a decision of the will, in fact, it is impossible to conceive him as acting otherwise. The will defines the direction, but other things are the motives to the will.

III. *Against Hobbes.*

Hobbes's later life was embittered with interminable controversies. It is no wonder, for his clear conception and forceful statement of a question of philosophy so directly counter to all tradition must needs raise up for him a host of enemies.

It would be going out of the way to more than mention the fact of his discussions—quarrels—with Ward and Wallis and Boyle, by whom his pretensions to mathematics and his utterances upon physical topics were mercilessly examined.

1. Bishop Bramhall.

Of direct importance to our theme is his discussion of Liberty and Necessity with Bishop Bramhall. The Bishop was an able Schoolman and a skillful disputant, so we have determinism and indeterminism in bitter strife.

A small treatise on "Liberty and Necessity" ³) appeared

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¹) E. IV: 273.

²) E. III: 197.

³) E. IV: 229—278.

1654, addressed to the Marquis of Newcastle in 1652. This was a reply to a discourse on the same subject by Bishop Bramhall. Hobbes answered the Bishop's arguments one by one, closing with a formulation of his own opinions about Liberty and Necessity. These opinions are precisely what he had already expressed in "Human Nature" and "Leviathan". This was all done in a friendly spirit, but the after discussions were superlatively bitter. In his introduction to "Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance",¹) Hobbes gives a history of the origin of the controversy in order to show that it was not of his seeking. It seems that Bramhall had fled with Newcastle after the battle of Marston Moor to Paris, where they met Hobbes. The two philosophers, in the presence of Newcastle, had a tilt about the old question of Free-will, from which dispute each man carried away his own opinion.²) Afterwards the Bishop sent Newcastle his opinions in writing, with the desire that he should persuade Hobbes to send his answer in writing. This Hobbes did. A surreptitious copy of this reply was published without Hobbes's knowledge and consent. This, innocently on Hobbes's part, angered the Bishop and led to the protracted controversy between them.

The Bishop's treatise following this episode, printed in 1655, is entitled, "A Defence of the True Liberty of Human Actions from Antecedent or Extrinsic Necessity". In 1656 Hobbes published his "Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance", in which he reprinted the Bishop's whole treatise, 'animadverting in language sharp as a razor upon every separate paragraph'.³)

Hobbes informs the reader, in the outset, that he will find in this volume questions discussed, that have long puzzled and perplexed the minds of curious men, namely, concerning Necessity, Freedom and Chance. The arguments are drawn (1) from the authority of Scripture, (2) from the doctrine of

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¹) E. V: Int.

²) E. IV: 2.

³) R. 166.

the Schools, (3) from natural reason, (4) from the consequences pertaining to common life; and the subject is debated by two men, both of whom adhere to Scripture, but one is a School-divine, while the other is a non-admirer of that kind of learning.

A specimen of the arguments drawn from Scripture is this speech of Joseph's: 'It was not you that sent me hither, but God'. The Schoolmen interpret it thus: 'It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it: it was God that sent me and not you'. As much as to say the selling was not the sending. Hobbes would ask the Bishop, if the selling of Joseph did not infallibly and inevitably follow the permission? If so, it was necessitated beforehand; if not how can the foreknowledge of it be attributed to God, when by the liberty of the human will it might have been frustrated? [1]

Another instance is where the Bishop claims that Solomon's choice of wisdom, instead of long life or riches, is a case of true liberty from necessity. Hobbes replies that such places in Scripture are clear enough to prove election, but are not strong enough to disprove the necessity of election. Because God gave Solomon his choice, it does not follow that he did not also give him the act of election. [2]

Against the Bishop's interpretation of these words to Adam: 'Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat'? Hobbes maintains that God placed in the garden a means to keep him from dying, provided he could accommodate his will to the obedience of the commandment. Adam, however, was not such a master of his own will as to do it. 'Whereby is signified that a mortal man, though invited by the promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called liberty'. [3] These examples are sufficient to show the interesting and instructive character of the discussion. Hobbes with unerring accuracy finds the weak spots of indeterminism, and he does it, too, with a kind of grim satisfaction.

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[1] E. V: 11.

[2] E. V: 97.

[3] E. V: 101.

He felt that he had fully disposed of the question between them, and that there would be no more of it. This is indicated in his closing paragraph where he says he had been publicly injured by many of whom he took no notice, but that he thought it necessary at last to make an example of some of them, and first of this Bishop.[1] But this was not the last of the Bishop, for he published his "Castigations of Hobbes's Animadversions", and "The Catching of Leviathan the Great Whale", in 1658. This last Hobbes answered.[2]

2. The Cambridge Platonists.

When Hobbes, in the midst of a society upturned and religion run mad, pushed his mechanical theory to practical conclusions as to Manners, Society, and Worship, he offended the common sense of thoughtful men. To explain the motive of man's conduct as selfseeking was to degrade human nature to brutish instinct and to wipe out what we name the fine and noble sentiments of the heart;[3] to base the institutions of society upon the principle, and that a persistent one, that man to man is a wolf, is gigantic naturalism;[4] to maintain that worship is the fear of an individual power, is blasphemous.[5]

The most significant reaction against this philosophy, particularly for its ethical import, was inaugurated through a group of divines called the Cambridge Platonists. These men tired of the wranglings of theologians, welcomed the speculative spirit of the seventeenth century in the hope that religion and philosophy could be united upon the solid basis of reason.

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[1] E. V: 455.

[2] E. IV: 279—384.

[3] L. II: 98 seq.; E. III: 176; E. II: 8, 12.

[4] L. II: 161 seq.; E. II: 6; E. III: 118.

[5] L. III: 45; E. III: 45, 92, 105, 129.

The chief names of this group are Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. They were by some of their contemporaries identified with the new, or mechanical philosophy. They were called "Latitude-Men".¹) They were not identified with the new philosophy in any other sense than its spirit of progress. Like true Platonists they abandoned themselves to the joy and interest of elevated thoughts. But they found in Hobbes's Naturalism a degradation of every ideal they were cherishing for mankind in society and church; so it was in opposition to the cogency of this thinker and writer that we find their Platonic speculations coming to the front. Their endeavor was to find a rational basis for religion and morality; this they did, but in the fetters and bonds of ancient opinion, which Hobbes had already taught the people to despise.

Hobbes had ever before him a large and practical purpose. He turned his back upon the supersensual conceits of the Schoolmen as not only worthless, but positively harmful; he kept in full view the phenomenal world as the region whence the exorcism of traditional authority must come. He was not mistaken. To find the principle on which the generation of the phenomena, Body—Man—Citizen, could be explained was the task he set himself. His success was as remarkable as his plan was comprehensive. In his trilogy, and "Leviathan", he really opened up the sciences of Psychology, Ethics and Politics, and has been so fruitful of suggestions in these lines of inquiry to after-thinkers, that Cowley, perhaps, does not overestimate him, in naming him the 'great Columbus of the golden lands of new philosophies'.²)

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¹) Tulloch Vol. II: 22 note. A pamphlet, 'A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men; together with some Reflections upon the New Philosophy'.

²) L. I: Introd.

CHAPTER III.

JOHN LOCKE (1632—1704).

I. *Empiricism.*

Locke took up the psychological analysis instituted by Hobbes and pushed it on to new and significant results. Hobbes had expressly said that there is not a conception in a man's mind which was not at first, totally, or by parts, begotten upon the organs of sense.[1]) And Locke, in stating his purpose in the beginning of the "Essay", waives all physical consideration of the mind, that is, deems all speculation concerning the motions of our spirits, or the alterations of our bodies, whereby we come to have sensations and ideas, as lying outside his design.[2]) This would indicate a more immediate indebtedness to Hobbes than critics commonly allow; on the other hand, Descartes's inspiration is manifest in Locke's attitude towards the doctrine of innate ideas.

In the purpose to investigate the certainty and extent of human knowledge, Locke was in thorough accord with the spirit of the reaction against Scholasticism. It is of prime importance that man know himself, especially in his limitations. He thought it of great use that a sailor know the length of his line although he cannot fathom all the depths of the ocean with it. Knowing that it is not long enough to reach the bottom, it is still long enough to direct his voyage and keep him off the schoals.[3]) In such a spirit he undertook to study the nature of the knowing faculties in their relations to the objects known. This is Locke's specific work. Hobbes would explain the generation of the *phenomenal* world; Locke would explain the generation of our *knowledge* of this world.

Locke, then, confines himself to the experimental study of the human faculties. His preliminary work is to clear the field of the doctrine of innate ideas. It should be kept in mind that Locke uses the word *idea* in its primary meaning of a mental picture, or a mental experience considered as a definite object of thought. The not understanding this was the source of the Bishop of Worcester's misinterpretations.[1]

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[1]) E. III: I.

[2]) Lk. I: 128.

[3]) Lk. I: 133.

In the sense of something that can be seen, — with the mind's eye, Locke states that it is an established opinion among some men that the soul brings into the world with its first being, and stamped upon it, certain primary notions or characters.[2] A moment's consideration of his figure of *tabula rasa* reveals clearly Locke's view of innate ideas. He misunderstands the radical point of this doctrine as taught by Descartes, that innate ideas are nothing more than implicit native knowledge requiring definite experiences to develop it.

Book First of the "Essay" is a polemic against the doctrine of innate ideas. His most telling argument is the challenge to the advocates of the doctrine to produce a scheme of these innate principles. This could be easily done since they are stamped upon the mind. There could be no more mistake about number than there is about the number of our fingers. The fact that the great majority of the defenders of the theory attempt no enumeration, and the fact that those who do, differ so widely as to the number and rank of these principles, that one might suspect that the supposition that such principles exist is a mere opinion picked up at random.[3]

Having disposed of the question of innate ideas, he then proceeds to inquire how the mind is furnished with all its variety of knowledge. He compares the mind of the child to a blank sheet of white paper, and concludes that all knowledge ultimately derives itself from Experience.

When we look a little more closely to find whence come, not knowledge in general, but the specific factors of knowledge, namely, ideas, we find two sources: *Sensation* and

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[1] Lk. II: 339 seq.

[2] Lk. I: 135.

[3] Lk. I: 169 seq.

Reflection. Sensation is the one great gateway for ideas into the mind; reflection upon the operations of the mind as it busies itself with these ideas, furnishes another class of ideas such as, perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing and willing.[1] Through the power, which the mind posesses, of repeating, comparing and uniting the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, our complex ideas are produced. It is not in the power of the understanding to create or destroy one idea. In Locke's words: The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, being much the same as it is in the great world of visible things, wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand.[2]

The simple ideas come, *nolens volens,* into the mind, but the understanding has unlimited power to modify and transform them. The complex ideas that can thus be formed are classed under three heads: modes; substances; relations. Our complex ideas of Immensity, Identity and Diversity, Cause and Effect, ... God, are resolved by Locke into the simple ideas of sensation and reflection.

There is one idea that baffled him, namely, Substance. His failure to account for this in terms of simple sensation and reflection revealed the weakness of his system. He could understand how the idea of horse could be resolved into such simple ideas as extension, figure, solidity, weight and so forth, but there must be for these qualities a substratum in which they inhere. He confesses we can have no clear idea of the thing we must suppose to be the support. If one will examine himself concerning the notion of Substance in general, he will find that he has no other idea of it than a supposition of an unknown somewhat that supports such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us.[3] One may imagine that he felt a little chagrined on finding a problem so 'knotty', when he says: They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word substance to support them. [2])

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[1] Lk. 1: 205.

[2] Lk. 1: 224.

[3] Lk. 1: 423.

It must not be imagined that because Locke could form no distinct idea of Substance, that he therefore denied its existence. The Bishop of Worcester reasoned in this way and claimed that Locke had almost discarded substance out of the world. [1]) If it is an 'unknown somewhat' then you do not know that it is a 'somewhat' at all. This is the sort of reasoning that led to Berkeley's scepticism with regard to the existence of matter, and to Hume's, with regard to mind.

This is the crowning defect of the experience philosophy, it affords abundant *entrance* through sensation to the phenomenal, but has no *outlet* into the metaphysical realm. The whole kingdom of Substance, or essence, which lies aback of our impressions is unknown, and unknowable, this is empiricism pushed to its extreme logical conclusion.

II. *Determinism.*

In the discussion of Power [3]) Locke sets forth his doctrine of determinism. The first step is to find how we get the idea of power. All power relates to action, but there are only two kinds of action of which we can have any idea: thinking and motion. Body, of course, affords us no idea of thinking, nor can we have from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest gives no idea of active power, and when put in motion by another we have more the idea of a passion than any action in it. The idea of the beginning of motion we get from a reflection upon what passes within us, where we can by a bare thought of the mind move parts of the body which were before at rest.

In ourselves we find the power to begin or forbear, continue or end the actions of our minds and motions of our bodies by a mere preference of the mind commanding it. This preference of motion or rest in any particular case is what we call will, and the actual exercise of this power is volition or willing. The power of perceiving is implied in that of preferring, that is, there can really be no preference without previous perception. So perception, which is understanding, must precede preference, which is the will.

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[1]) Lk. I: 293.

[2]) Lk. II: 353.

[3]) Lk. I: 359—415.

When we say that the will is the commanding power, and yet maintain that it can exercise no authority without precedent knowledge, we have the two ideas of liberty and necessity.

But what is liberty? Recall that all actions reduce themselves to thinking and motion, then in so far as man has the power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, is he free. If he have the preference to do or not to do a certain thing, and yet have not the power to carry into execution this preference, then he is not free. Hence the idea of liberty is the idea of power in any agent to do or to forbear, according to the determination of the mind expressed in the preference of one action over another.

Liberty belongs to the agent, and not to any power which he possesses. Liberty is itself a power. To ask if the will be free, is to ask if one power can have another power as its attribute. Powers belong only to agents and are attributes only of substances, so the question resolves itself into whether the will itself be a substance, that is, an agent?

The word *faculty* which men have used in designating the power of the will has, perhaps, led to the confusion. But if we make faculties distinct beings then when we speak of the willing faculty, to be consistent, we must say we have a speaking faculty, a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, and so on; and so, if the willing faculty wills, then the speaking, walking, and dancing faculties, speak, walk and dance. The exercise of these powers belongs to the agent and not to the powers themselves. Powers are relations, not agents, and that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is what is free or not free, and not the power itself. Man, the agent, is free, but in regard to willing he is determined. Willing is an action, and freedom consists in the power of acting or not acting, therefore when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, he must make a decision in regard to it. The existence or non-existence of the action depends upon the determination of the will; it is absolutely necessary that he will one or the other of the alternatives. The 'chief market of our time' is spent in choosing between alternatives. Every day and every hour we are under the necessity of preferring one thing to another, so the will has not the power to act or not to act, in which alone consists liberty.

The next question is, what determines the will? It is determined by something without it. What is it? The motive is some uneasiness. A little reflection will show that desire is a state of uneasiness. This uneasiness of desire is the spring of our actions. In the conflict of the sundry uneasinesses by which we are beset, and the distractions of different desires, which one of these takes precedence in determining the will to the next action? It is the most pressing of those thought capable of being removed, for the will of an intelligent being cannot be conceived as directing energies to ends, clear to reason, to be unattainable at the moment. It is not necessarily any vision of positive good, nor the far off prospect of heavenly joys, that determines the will immediately to any action, but it is some uneasiness, the removal of which is the next step towards peace or happiness. The drunkard, for example, knows, to his bitter regret, what woes and miseries of body and mind he is heaping up for himself and family in his course of inebriety, and keenly realizes the blessings of health and happiness that follow upon a sober life of self-control; and yet the habitual thirst overmasters all his good resolutions and sends him back to the mire. It is a pressing uneasiness that he must relieve. It is not necessary to account for the *existence* of such an 'uneasiness' at any moment, in order to prove that the will is determined. Whencesoever comes the uneasiness it must be relieved, and the action which brings the relief follows a decision of the will to that end, but the whole procedure may be disapproved by the moral sense. If we contemplate our actions singly with reference to their motives, we find that Saint Paul expressed a universal experience in saying: For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.[1] So while the will determines the agent to action, it is itself determined. The 'greatest pressing uneasiness' and the 'last appetite' in deliberation are one and the same: Locke and Hobbes are of the same mind on this question.

So far from the doctrine of determination's being prejudicial to either the moral or religious interests of mankind, Locke says the freest agents are determined. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.[2]

III. *Controversy with the Bishop of Worcester.*

Locke's most important controversy was with Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, who, in 1696, published his "Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity", in which he criticised the principles of the "Essay" as heterodox in their tendencies. Locke replied in a "Letter to the Bishop of Worcester." There followed "Answers" and "Replies" until the controversy became voluminous.

The Bishop argued in one instance that the doctrine against innate ideas invalidated an argument commonly relied upon to prove the existence of God, namely, universal consent.[1] Locke replied that not one word of his could be construed against this argument for a God, and that he labored to show that the idea of God is innate. Instead of measuring Locke's argument for its own worth, he measured it by its seeming contradiction of another argument used by the orthodox world, time out of mind, for the same purpose. This, to say the least of it, is illustrative of the Bishop's lack of logical acumen.

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[1] Rom. VII: 19.

[2] Lk. 1: 391.

Locke's notion of Substance was interpreted unfavorably with reference to the terminology of the Athanasian Creed. He was charged with doubting the being, or existence, of substance, or rendering it so by the imperfect idea given of it. Locke reminded the Bishop that he had everywhere spoken of the *idea* of substance as indefinite, but had never doubted its existence any more than he had doubted his own. The being of substance is not shaken, because we can have only an obscure and imperfect idea of it; there are many things granted to have being of which we have no ideas at all.[2]

The resolution of personal identity into present and recollected states of consciousness[3] seemed inconsistent with the article of Faith concerning the resurrection of the dead. Locke objected that the Scriptures nowhere taught, *expressly*, the resurrection of the body, much less its resurrection according to the Bishop's interpretation. The discussion proceeds and the Bishop admits that the notion of personal identity belongs to the same man under several changes of matter; that it is not necessary that the body to be raised should consist of the same particles of matter which were united at the point of death. So when the Bishop contends that Locke's idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection, on the ground that it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same person, Locke retorts that the Bishop's own notion of personal identity, according to his own rule, is inconsistent with the article.[1] This serves to show that Stillingfleet was no match for Locke, and that he was not clever enough to see how orthodox opinions were unaffected by Locke's philosophy.

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[1] Lk. 1: 346.

[2] Lk. 1: 352

[3] Lk. 1: 466 seq.

Hobbes had a broad practical ambition in constructing the phenomenal world on mechanical principles; Locke with his keen and original psychological analysis had a more definite but still as practical a purpose in explaining the world as it was mirrored in consciousness. The examination of individual experience led him to accept the formula, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, to which he was indissolubly wedded by his metaphor of 'a sheet of white paper'.

It is not to be supposed that he did not recognize the existence of the a priori side of knowing. He was, however, satisfied to say that the wise Contriver of all things had endowed us with 'faculties'[2] suitable to the apprehension of the facts that make up our life. He deemed it sufficient for his aims, to begin with simple ideas as given in consciousness, so he attempted no explanation of how these ideas find themselves in consciousness. That he ignored the a priori element so persistently must be placed to the charge of his misconception of the doctrine of innate ideas which he was combatting. The consequent defects of his system determined Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, largely, in their several directions of philosophical inquiry.

CHAPTER IV.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ (1646—1716).

I. *Monadology.*

The "Essay on the Human Understanding" led to the "Nouveaux Essais" written in vindication of the doctrine of innate ideas. To the formula, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non*

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[1] Lk. 11: 375.

[2] Lk. 1: 430.

prius fuerit in sensu, Leibniz added, *nisi intellectus ipse,* thus taking a subjective standpoint as against Locke. But Leibniz philosophized in a spirit of reconciliation; from the rise of his interest in the new philosophy through reading Descartes, then Spinoza's solution of the Cartesian doctrine of Occasionalism, on to his own system of Individualism, the course of development is interesting.

At fifteen he was a student at the University of Leipzig where he took philosophy, ancient and scholastic; through private study at the same time he became acquainted with the philosophy of Descartes. His academic dissertation, "De Principio Individui",[1]) written two years later (1663), shows his knowledge of the old as well as his inclination to the new philosophy. On this old problem of the Schoolmen he took the position that individual things exist, and here we find the germ of his later philosophical doctrines.

The unfruitfulness of Scholasticism in contrast with the new led him, in his Rosenthal ramble, to decide to adopt the mechanical view of nature. He says in this connection, of the moderns: Leurs belles manieres d'expliquer la nature mecaniquement me charmèrent, et je méprisois avec raison la methode de ceux qui n'employent que des formes ou des facultés dont on n'apprend rien.[2]) This decision called for the profound study of mathematics, which resulted later in the invention of the Calculus.

In his "Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas"[3]) (1668) he suggested the inadequacy of the mechanical philosophy as taught by Bacon, Galileo, Gassendi, and others. The mechanical theory explains the necessary connection and interdependence of things; explains how beginning with a certain phenomenon we may through the necessary connections reach all others; it is sufficient to explain why this fact, here and now, or that fact, there and then, occurs and not something else.

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[1]) Gerh. IV; Erd. 1.

[2]) Gerh. IV: 478.

[3]) Gerh. IV: 107; Erd. 45.

But while presupposing a general order and necessary arrangement of things, it yet fails to explain why this special order should exist rather than some other imaginable arrangement. Here is where Leibniz would amend the new philosophy with the doctrine of final causes. Out of the reconciliation of final with mechanical causes his system emerges.

We have seen where and how his interest in things as individuals began. In his "Theoria Motus Abstracti"[1] (1671) he says there is no such thing as an absolutely inert body; that a body has something more than mere extension, it is endowed with force. To this effect he wrote in this same year to Arnauld: A me deprehensum est essentiam corporis non consistere in extensione, quod putarat Cartesius, sed in motu, ac proinde substantiam corporis seu naturam, etiam Aristotelis definitione consentiente, esse principium motus.[2]

The next year, 1672, found him in Paris, whither his fame had preceded him. He was received by that brilliant coterie of learned men for which Paris was at that time justly distinguished. He studied under the noted mathematician and physicist Huygens, and found important suggestions in the microscopical investigations of Swammerdam, Malpighi, and Leeuwenhoek.[3] He of course, came fully under the influence of Descartes's philosophy. A four years' sojourn in such company was pregnant with results for his own philosophy.

The Cartesian doctrine of two substances, one extended, and the other thinking, was defective in that there was not a common principle which united and actuated both. Extension nor motion was the essence of bodies, nor was thinking the essence of mind. These were only the forms under which their common real existence manifested itself.

Further he perceived that the idea of motion's being the essence of extended things had led the Cartesians astray as to the mathematics of the quantity of motion in the universe, which they represented as constant, under the formula, $m \times v$. This was a legitimate inference from the standpoint that all motion is communicated to bodies from without. [1])

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[1] Gerh. 1: 75.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Gerh. 1: 335.

According to Leibniz the measure of force is expressed by the product of the mass and the square of the velocity, which means that matter is not dead and inert, but that external things contain an active principle by virtue of which they persist. [2]) Extended things are themselves the centres and bearers of force. The next step was to inquire into the nature of this force.

He kept in mind that the solution must hold good for the thinking substance as well as for the extended, and thus be reconcilable with the law of continuity, so he turned to consider the thinking process of the mind. Material things present the property of extension to the senses and not to the thinking faculty. The mind being analytic is obliged to view every whole as infinitely divisible. Whatever is presented to the senses as a compact unity must for the thinking process be an aggregate of an infinite number of infinitesimal parts. The argument is, if the aspect of matter revealed by the senses is inferior to that seen by the thinking faculty, extension is not the real property of material things. [3])

The atoms of Gassendi did not carry the division of matter far enough, they were still finite and material, so Leibniz' mathematical mind extended the division to infinity. The atoms become mere centers of force without any extension. They become mathematical points, but as the extension decreases to zero the intension increases to infinity. The vital principle of these points he assumed to be analogous to that of the human mind. This metaphysical point is the *monad,* which is the central idea of his philosophy. [4])

With the reduction of all things to monads the distinction between matter and mind disappears. What is the real nature of these metaphysical points of existence? In saying that it is mental indicates at the same time its process of development. Thought, the real life of the mind, is ever active. Thinking means the ceaseless flow of ideas, the constant coming of new materials into the light of consciousness, and the relegation of the old to the dim realms of memory. This activity of the mind is peculiarly its own, and is not borrowed from without. The self-activity of the monad makes it self-sufficient, and its self-sufficiency makes it a microcosm and a mirror of the universe.1)

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[1]) Gerh. IV: 442; Erd. 108, 133, 702.

[2]) Gerh. IV: ch. XII.

[3]) Discours. Ch. XI; IV: 482.

[4]) Gerh. II: 75; IV: 482; Erd. — 126.

If what we call real things are reducible to metaphysical points, all of which are solitary in their self-sufficiency, it follows that the *connection* of things is purely intellectual, and not actual. The type of the connection is the mathematical formula, where the quantities represented are mere links in a chain of logical reasoning. As with the links in a logical process, so things really are intellectually, and not materially, determined by all others. As an equation can be solved with reference to any of its quantities, so the universe is represented from the standpoint of every individual thing.

What appears to us as action and reaction, is due to the original nature of things connected in an intellectual harmony in the mind of God. Here we have the reconciliation of mechanical and final causes in the doctrine of pre-established harmony.2)

II. *Determinism.*

Every monad is an individual whose inner life is mental; it is self-sufficient and self-active; it is possessed of a constant endeavor to greater clearness of thought. Monads differ from one another only in the degree of clearness of thought. Consistent with the law of continuity the gradation of monads from the lowest to the highest, the mind of God, where all things are clear, is infinite.

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1) Discours. chs. 8, 9.

2) Discours. ch. 33. Gerh. IV: 477; II: 74.

Monads which are unconscious, that is, in the blackness of intellectual obscurity, are called simply, *monads;* those that have perceptions merely, are *souls;* those that have apperceptions are *minds,* thinking monads.[1])

It may seem paradoxical to maintain that a monad, being self-sufficient and ever striving to clearness of thought, should find any hindrance thereto. Is not the monad predetermined according to Leibniz' teaching? It is predetermined in its nature, but not in the occasions of its development, that is, it must develop according to its nature, when it does develop. In other words, the *how* of its development lies within its own nature; but the *when,* depends upon occasions, which are its relations to other monads. An illustration will make the matter clear. An acorn has in it potentially, an oak. This nature of the acorn is predetermined, but when this acorn will develop into an oak depends upon occasions. Of course, according to pre-established harmony, the occasions are predetermined, but they are only known to God, so it does not affect the free development of the individual. A monad is free to develop, when it does develop, along the line of its inherent nature. As the acorn can develop into nothing but an oak, no matter into what soil it is planted, so monads are windowless[2]), and cannot give to, nor receive from, one another, any contribution to their essential natures. The relation of one monad to another is purely occasional and not causal.

The thinking monad, which is the perfect type of the human mind, has conscious aspirations to clearness of thought, the attainment of which is made doubtful by its (occasional) dependence upon other monads. At this point the question of the will enters. The mind, not knowing its preordained order of development, chooses on its own responsibility its course step by step. The question is, what determines the will to its choice of the next step? There is always a sufficient reason (it may be hidden) in the sumtotal of the past developed life of the individual. In the language of psychology, the decision of the will in any given instance will depend on the apperceiving content. We learn in terms of what we already know. We accept the future as it comes to us, but we interpret it in the terms of our own past experiences. Our 'stock in trade' of experience determines what we shall do under given circumstances. We have in ourselves what we shall be.

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[1]) Erd. 705.

[2]) Erd. 705.

What 'the last appetite', or 'the greatest pressing uneasiness', in any case will be, depends of course upon the nature and development of the individual, so the difference between Leibniz, and Hobbes, and Locke, is merely that of looking at the same thing from opposite sides. Locke took notice of this side of the question in discussing why men came to pursue different courses.[1] He thought the old philosophers inquired in vain whether the greatest good lay in riches, or sensual gratification, or virtue, or contemplation. They might as well have disputed whether the best relish was to be found in apples, plums, potatoes or nuts, and thus have divided themselves into various schools. Because agreeable tastes depend not upon the things themselves, but upon the individual palates in their endless variety. In other words choice depends ultimately upon the individual nature. Leibniz, to be consistent, must discuss the question of the will from this standpoint. He is clear enough though in regarding the freedom of the will as an absurd question. He says: Nous ne voulons point vouloir, mais nous voulons faire, et si nous voulions vouloir, nous voudrions vouloir vouloir, et cela irait à l'infini.[2]

To illustrate how human freedom and Divine sovereignty can hang together without making God the author of sin, Leibniz takes up a dialogue[3] of Laurentius Valla's on the freedom of the will, at the point where the author confesses his inability to solve the problem, and continues it in accordance with his own doctrines.

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[1] Lk. I: 395.

[2] Erd. 255.

[3] Erd. 621.

Sextus Tarquinius consults the oracle and receives an unfavorable answer. Leibniz objects that Providence under the name of Jupiter is made the author of the sin, so he carries on the fable, sending Sextus to Dodona to Jupiter. He complains to Jupiter: 'Why have you condemned me, O great god, to be bad and unhappy? Change my fate and my heart, or acknowledge your wrong.' Jupiter replies: 'If you will renounce Rome the Fates will spin another destiny for you; you will become wise, and you will be happy'. Then Sextus asks: 'Why ought I to renounce the hope of a crown? Can I not be a good king?' Jupiter answers: 'No, Sextus; I know better what you need. If you go to Rome you are lost.' Sextus unwilling to make the sacrifice went forth to his destiny.

Theodore, the highpriest, who presided at the interview, was surpriesed that his god was not good enough to give Sextus another will, presuming that he was able to do it. Jupiter sends him to Pallas who will show him what he (Jupiter) was obliged to do in the case. The priest is transported in a dream to Athens and awakes to find himself in the palace of destinies under the tutelage of Pallas. Here are representations of all that happens and of all that is possible. Jupiter weighed all the possible worlds and chose this present one as the best of all. She shows Theodore some of these possible worlds that he may see that Sextus in these must be different from that he is in the present. If Jupiter had placed Sextus happy in Corinth, then that would have been this world no longer. But in this best of all possible worlds Sextus leaves Dodona in anger and goes to Rome and is lost. Pallas says her father did not make Sextus wicked, but he was so from all eternity and that by his own free will. Jupiter gave him existence which he could not refuse to the world in which he was included; he simply allowed him to pass from the region of the possible into that of the actual.

Essentiae rerum sunt Deo coaeternae. Et Dei ipsa essentia complectitur omnes alias essentias adeo ut Deus sine ipsis concipi non possit perfecte. [1])

The individual monad, Sextus, had a possible existence from all eternity, therefore God cannot be said to have created him; the evolution of his life could only take place in an actual world, so God gave him a place in this best of all worlds because the plan of this world demanded it; it was an intellectual necessity under which he came into the world, therefore God is not culpable for his actual existence; as a thinking being he was free, free to develop according to his inner nature, wherefore God is not responsible for Sextus's crimes.

The idea of God according to Aristotle, the flinging away of final causes by Hobbes, the dualism of Descartes, the monism of Spinoza, the one-sidedness of Locke, seemed to Leibniz to be 'at cross purposes', so in the spirit of reconciliation he translated the mechanical views of nature into the philosophy of Intellectualism and Individualism.

CHAPTER V.

DAVID HUME (1711—1776).

Scepticism.

Hume was fitted by nature for philosophical scepticism. There was no sentiment and no romance about him. He was thoroughly utilitarian in the whole range of his sympathies. To art in all its forms he was unresponsive. He lacked the imaginative power of looking behind phenomena for meanings. He could not say with Emerson:

Deep love lieth under
  These pictures of Time;
They fade in the depth of
  Their meaning sublime.

He was nevertheless a philosophical enthusiast, and having studied carefully his predecessors, he was convinced that nothing had been decided by them which was beyond the cavil of doubt. To him their theories were cobweb cloth spun out of their own brains, mere speculations that failed of everything because they failed to pierce to the mystery of mysteries, namely, Substance, or Essence.

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[1]) C. 70.

To his mind the question, What can we know? covered everything. He auswered it negatively. We cannot know the essence of things, therefore we cannot know the causes of things, wherefore, a man is a fool for believing that he knows, or can know, anything. He came by a short cut through the notion of causality to agnosticism.

Berkeley's criticism of the Lockian notion of Substance interested Hume more for its sceptical tendency than otherwise.[1] It was Locke's influence that decided his agnostic attitude, and Hobbes's influence that gave him the ground of his defence of this attitude in the notion of Causality. Locke says we derive our idea of cause and effect from the operations of bodies upon one another: that a cause is that which makes another thing begin to be, and an effect is that which takes its beginning in some other thing.[2] The *how* and *why* of one things making another begin to exist, is the secret hid within the essence of the things themselves. Locke further says: It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only in so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall here be the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas know that they agree with the things themselves?[3] With such a legacy from Locke, one might think he would be discouraged, but he modestly hopes 'to contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge by giving, in some particulars, a different turn to the speculations of philosophers'.[4]

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[1] SB. 155.
[2] Lk. I: 454.
[3] Lk. II: 170.
[4] K. 133.

Hume derives our knowledge from *impressions* and *ideas*, which differ from each other only in degree, impressions being the more lively, while ideas are the faint images of them. Impressions are of two kinds: of sensation; of reflection. The first class arise in the soul from unknown and unexplainable causes, the second are derived from our ideas. The process is something like this: an impression strikes upon the senses, a copy of this is made by the mind, which remains after the impression has ceased; this is an idea. If this idea return upon the soul and produce a new impression, that becomes an impression of reflection, and this, copied by memory and imagination becomes an idea, which in turn gives rise to other impressions and ideas. This is the process of elaboration, the beginning of which is in an impression of sensation. The priority of our impressions is a proof that they are the cause of our ideas.

In maintaining that impressions are the causes of our ideas, Hume does not claim any ultimate knowledge of the fact, but that it is merely a conviction founded in experience. He expressly says that impressions of sensation arise in the soul from unknown causes.[1] Whether the ultimate causes are in the subject, or object, or the Creator, he does not, and cannot, know; he has no other 'convincing proof' that the one causes the other than their 'constant conjunction'. This is the very key-note of his philosophy. This is the philosophy of experience carried to its furthest logical conclusion, 'speculative nihilism'.[2]

But Hume is thoroughly convinced that all genuine ideas are derived from impressions, and that we can test the genuineness of ideas by an appeal to experience for the corresponding impressions. Evidently to his mind the idea of the relation of cause and effect was the most important, so at some length he discusses its origin. It is not attained by reasonings apriori, but entirely from experience. Our reason unaided by experience can never draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.[1]) Suppose an object presented to us and we required to pronounce concerning the effect that will result from it, without being allowed to appeal to past observation, how would we proceed in the matter?[2]) The question suggests the answer.

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[1] Treatise I. Secs. 1. 2. 3.

[2] K. 3.

It is in the world of experience, where we find familiar objects or results constantly and regularly conjoined, that we immediately infer the existence of one object on the appearance of another. We have no knowledge of the secret powers by which the one produces the other, yet we are as surely determined to infer a causal conection as if we had our own hands on the hidden springs. There is, then, a principle, which is not the understanding, nor of the understanding, that brings us to the notion of causality. It is Custom or Habit.[3])

II. *Determinism.*

Hume derives our idea of *power* or *necessary connection,* not from reflecting on the operations of our own minds, but from a *felt* connection between events, to which the mind is brought by habit.

The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected* with the other, but only that they were *conjoined.* After having observed several instances of this nature he pronounces them *conjoined.* The difference is that now he *feels* these events to be *connected* in his imagination, and so can readily foretell the one on the appearance of the other. We therefore say one object is connected with another when they have acquired such a connection in our thought that the one becomes the proof of the other's existence. The one event conveys the mind by

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1) SB. 27.
2) SB. 28.
3) SB. 42.

a customary transition to the other. This is the all-in-all of the origin of this idea.[1]

By the application of this principle he proves that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty and necessity.

In the first place, all mankind have ever allowed that the doctrine of necessity is operative (1) in the voluntary actions of men, and (2) in the operations of mind.[2]

It is universally acknowledged that human nature is the same the world over and in all ages. The same motives are the springs of the same actions; the same events follow the same causes. All the passions that were the sources of actions and enterprises in the hoary past are still operative today in like directions. History shows us nothing new in mankind in this particular.[3] 'One touch of nature makes the whole world kin'.

The conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between cause and effect in any part of nature, and this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged, in philosophy as well as in common life. From the experienced uniformity of human actions men draw their inferences concerning the future. The mutual dependence of men in all the relations of life is a proof of their faith in the uniformity of human actions. The countryman when he brings his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price, expects to find purchasers, and, in turn, with the money thus acquired expects to find others who will furnish him with the commodities he himself lacks. Likewise when men extend their schemes of business, they comprehend in their plans a greater variety of voluntary actions, which, they calculate, upon proper motives, will cooperate with their own.[4]

In all the branches of speculative learning, the inference from motives to voluntary actions, from character to conduct to conflict ! Piety ? science

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[1] SB. 75.

[2] SB. 83.

[3] SB. 85.

[4] SB. 89.

is as necessary as in the affairs of everyday life. Otherwise, what would History be? How could there be a science of Politics? Where would be the foundation for Morals? ¹)

Mankind have ever agreed, also, in the doctrine of liberty. But what is liberty when spoken of with reference to voluntary actions? It is *a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.* In other words, we may move, if we choose to; or we may remain at rest, if we so choose. This liberty is hypothetical, for we may be prisoners and in chains.²) It is a liberty of the agent and he therefore may not be free to execute the choice of his will.

Men universally agree that nothing happens without a cause. They eliminate *chance* from the economy of the universe; it is a mere negative word, for to say that anything happens by chance is to mean that it happens without a cause. The division of causes into *necessary* and *unnecessary* is also idle talk, for we can frame no definition of cause which does not contain the idea of necessary connection. From all which we argue that a liberty opposed to necessity does not exist since that would be chance; and that the only true liberty is that opposed to constraint. This is necessitarianism pure and simple, but there is no other issue to the philosophy of experience.

If after such a course of reasoning we should still have a lingering consciousness of freedom of will, Hume would convince us that it arises not from a real, but from a seeming experience. The necessity of any action of matter or mind is in *us* who contemplate the action; it is nothing more than the determination of our thoughts to infer the existence of one action from another that precedes; the connection is *felt* by *us* as necessary. Liberty, as apposed to necessity, is the lack of this determination, a kind of indifference to inferring one thing from another When we reflect upon the actions of our own minds, we do not so often feel this indifference,

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¹) SB. 90.

²) SB. 95.

because we can 'put ourselves in his place' and *feel* the necessary connection between motives and actions, but when we perform an action ourselves, we seem to feel that we could have done the other thing.[1] This feeling does not come, however, till the action is performed, and then comes as a result of imagining the other thing done by us. Of two things presented to us to be done, we must do one, and we shall have a sufficient reason for doing the one and not the other. After the one is done, and therefore no longer a questioning factor, we feel that we can do the other, and so imagine we could have done it from the first.

If Locke shocked the orthodox world, Hume was more offensive. His doctrine of necessity was considered dangerous in its consequences to religion and morality, because it destroyed responsibility. So far from this, the very idea of responsibility is based upon the belief in necessary connection between motives and acts. All law is founded upon rewards and punishments on the ground that these motives incite to good, prevent bad actions. Actions are the proofs of principles in the mind, but except for the doctrine of necessity they could not be taken as evidence of anything, good or bad.

Likewise liberty, as opposed to necessity, is essential to morality; for where it is lacking, actions can have no moral quality. If a man is not free to execute the decisions of his own will, is compelled from without, his actions be they what they may, are neither praiseworthy nor blameable. In bringing voluntary actions under the law of necessity God becomes the ultimate author of our volitions, therefore human actions can have no turpitude without involving the Creator with the creature in the same guilt. Hume confesses that this is a mystery with which unassisted reason is unfit to deal. He says: To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction![1]

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[1] SB. 94.

The determination of the will is a question of paramount importance, because of its consequences to moral conduct and religious life. The determination of the will is the determination of the man. All questions of the present and the future hang upon the decisions of the will. As a man believes, so is he. The appeal to philosophy for the settlement of the question has resulted in conflicting opinions. A system of philosophy is tested by its utterances on the question of the freedom of the will.

When the theology of the Middle Ages needed a philosophy for its foundation, it took, in the interests of its dogmas, the philosophy that favored free will. The revolt against this philosophy brought out the mechanical view of things, and explained the will as determined by motives. The proofs of this determination, according to the mechanical principles of things, were conclusive enough, but along therewith came the demand that this philosophy should account for the existence of evil, and reconcile the determination of will with the doctrine of Grace.

If Leibniz' answer was not satisfactory, it, at least, served to show that the apriori element could not be ignored as a factor in the problem. Kant, aroused by the extreme issue of the philosophy of Experience at Hume's hands, undertook the rehabilitation of the apriori element of knowledge, giving us the philosophy of Criticism, answering the questions that cover all speculative and practical interests, namely, (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope?

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[1] SB. 103.

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PERSONAL.

Was born near Pembroke, Kentucky, U. S. A. My early training was received in what is known as the "Subscription Schools" of the period immediately succeeding the Civil War. At eighteen was sent to Bethel College, in Russellville, Kentucky, in 1872. Graduated with the degree of B.A. in 1878, and M. A. in 1881. Teacher of Latin and Mathematics in Parker's Grove High School, Larue County, Ky., in 1878—79; Professor of Latin and Greek, Bardstown Institute, (Ky.) 1879—81; President of Liberty Female College, Glasgow, Ky., 1881—83. Married to Miss Mary A. Grubbs, Dec. 27th 1882. Professor of English Literature, Bethel College, 1883—94. Acting Professor of Philosophy, Bethel College 1886—94; Scholar in Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 1891. Member of the Modern Language Association of America; Member of the American Dialect Society; Lecturer before the Monteagle (Tenn.) Summer Schools 1892—93; and before the Florida Chautauqua, 1893. On leave of absence from Bethel College to study abroad, I became a student of the University of Leipzig in Oct. 1894. Have heard with pleasure and profit Professors Heinze, Wundt, Volkelt, and Birch-Hirschfeld. Am especially indebted to Professor Heinze for friendly counsel.

John Phelps Fruit.

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